A sobering assessment of the American economy argues that voter choices are behind most current problems while citing the more effective examples of other countries. Looks at tax reform, bankruptcy, health insurance, deregulation, corporate raiders, unemployment, and disappearing pensions. This book surveys the development of laws surrounding the crime of money laundering and the associated changes in the anti-money laundering AML industry. The policy of attempting to deal with crime by attacking its financial products started in the arena of drugs, but quickly moved to organised crime, terrorism, corruption and tax.
Now the focus has shifted once again to organised crime and to immigration. Taken together, however, it is demonstrated that they have led to significant changes in the law and to the current situation. Underlying the entire AML industry is the crime of money laundering, which, having been devised more to provide a trigger for the reporting machinery than to describe and condemn a particular category of harmful behaviour, is now being used in a far wider range of cases than is appropriate.
This book will be of great interest to scholars and practitioners of criminal and financial law, socio-legal studies and criminology. In , almost no one in France wanted to oust the king, let alone guillotine him. But things quickly escalated until there was no turning back. The French Revolution and What Went Wrong looks at what went wrong and why France would be better off if they had kept their monarchy. In a fascinating analysis of the great psychological and sociological thinkers—including Freud, Maslow, McClelland, Durkheim, Skinner, Lewin and Mead—this erudite text challenges the models, myths and metaphors of modern psychology.
Psychologists have promoted the view that human beings are the victims of internal and external forces, and have laboured to absorb free and responsible individuals into a pseudo-scientific framework that denies moral agency and thus renders them incapable of recognising notions of right and wrong.
This book will appeal to anyone who has read enough psychology to have been perplexed and frustrated by its famous emperors. It demonstrates that if we take these naked emperors seriously and deny human freedom and personal responsibility, we shall have contributed to the undermining of our civilisation.
Unravels the mystery of Argentina's impressive rise and spectacular failure in a fascinating historical narrative. Murray Friedman recounts for the first time the whole history of the Black-Jewish relationship in America, from colonial times to the present, and shows that this history is far more complex--and conflicted--than historians and revisionists admit. This volume is a valuable re-assessment of the Nicaraguan Revolution by a Marxist historian of Latin American political history.
An eminent constitutional scholar reveals how the explosion of rights is dividing America, and shows how we can build a better system of justice.
You have the right to remain silent and the right to free speech. The right to worship, and to doubt. During this period, the air lines were reconnected, the lockout removed, and the isolation valve opened. The take-off branch was dismantled with the Demco valve open. Illustrarion courtesy of the US. Department of h b o r. Preparation for Maintenance 5 In both incidents, the procedures were poor and were not followed.
I1 is unlikely that the accidents occurred the first time this happened. If the managers had kept their eyes open, they might have seen that the procedures were not being followed. The explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha oil platform in the North sea, which killed people.
A pump relief valve was removed for overhaul and the open end blanked. Another shift, not knowing that the relief valve was missing. The blank was probably not tight, and light oil leaked past it and exploded in the confined processing area. Section When repairs were complete, the slip-plates were removed before the machine was tried out.
During the tryout, some ethylene leaked through the closed isolation valves into the machine. The ethylenelair mixture was ignited, either by a hot spot in the machine or by copper acetylide on the copper valve gaskets. The compressor was severely damaged. Isolations should not be removed until maintenance is complete. It is good practice to issue three work permits-one for inserting slip-plates or disconnecting pipework , one for the main job, and one for removing slip-plates or restoring disconnections.
A similar incident occurred on a solids drier. Before maintenance started, the end cover was removed, and the inlet line was disconnected. When maintenance was complete, the end cover was replaced, and at the same time the inlet pipe was reconnected. The final job was to cut off the guide pins on the cover with a cutting disc. The atmosphere outside but not inside the drier was tested, and no flammable gas was detected. While cutting was in progress, an explosion occurred in the drier.
Some solvent had leaked into the inlet pipe and then drained into the drier [19]. The inlet line should not have been reconnected before the guide pins were cut off.
No welding needed to be done, and no entry was required, so it was decided not to slip-plate off the reactor but to rely on valve isolations. Some flammable vapor leaked through the closed valves into the reactor and was ignited by a high-speed abrasive wheel, which was being used to cut through one of the pipelines attached to the vessel. The reactor head was blown off and killed two men. It was estimated that 7 kg of hydrocarbon vapor could have caused the explosion.
After the accident, demonstration cuts were made in the workshop. It was found that as the abrasive wheel broke through the pipe wall, a small flame occurred, and the pipe itself glowed dull red.
The explosion could have been prevented by isolating the reactor by slip-plates or physical disconnection. This incident and the others described show that valves are not good enough. One of the steam lines from the drum was used for stripping a process column operating at a gauge pressure of 30 psi 2 bar. A valve on the line to the column was closed, but the line was not slip-plated.
When the steam pressure was blown off, vapors from the column came back through the leaking valve into the steam lines Figure The company concerned normally used slip-plates to isolate equipment under repair. On this occasion, no slip-plate was fitted because it was "only" a steam line. However, steam and other service lines in plant areas are easily contaminated by process materials, especially when there is a direct connection to process equipment.
In these cases, the equipment under repair should be positively isolated by slip-plating or disconnection before maintenance. When a plant was taken out of use, the cooling water lines were left full of water.
Dismantling started nearly 20 years later. When a mechanic cut a cooling water line open with a torch, there was a small fire. Bacteria had degraded impurities in the water, forming hydrogen and methane [20].
Contamination of a steam drum by process materials. Plants should be emptied before they are mothballed or left for dismantling. Apart from the hazard just described, water can freeze and mpture lines see Section 9. Many years ago, river water was used for the water layer in a large kerosene storage tank. Bacterial decomposition of impurities formed methane, which exploded. As so often happens, the source of ignition was never found [21]. The slip-plate had been fitted to isolate the tank from the blowdown system while the tank was under maintenance.
When the maintenance was complete, the slip-plate was overlooked. Fortunately, the tank, an old one, was stronger than it needed to be for the duty. If a vessel has to be isolated from the vent or blowdown line, do not slip-plate it off, but whenever possible, disconnect it and leave the vessel vented to atmosphere as shown in Figure If the vent line forms part of a blowdown system, it will have to be blanked to prevent air being sucked in.
Make sure the blank is put on the flare side of the disconnection. Note that if the tank is to be entered. If a vent line has to be slip-plated because the line is too rigid to be moved, then the vents should be slip-plated last and de-slip-plated first. If all slip-plates inserted are listed on a register, they are less likely to be overlooked. The right and wrong ways to isolate a vent line. It had corroded right through Figure Slip-plates in position for a long time should be removed and inspected before being used as maintenance isolations.
Such slip-plates should be registered for inspection every few years. Tags should be at least mm long on lines up to and including 6-in. Figure-8 plates are better than slip-plates, as their position can be seen at a glance; Figure-8 plates should be used on lines that have to be slip-plated regularly. Although the initial cost is higher, they are always available on the job, while slipplates tend to disappear and have to be replaced. Figure shows a thin slip-plate that has been subjected to a gauge pressure of psi 32 bar.
Preparation for Maintenance 9 Figure A slip-plate left in position for many months had corroded right through. Figure A slip-plate bowed by a gauge pressure of psi 32 bar. Slip-plates should normally be designed to withstand the same pressure as the piping.
However, in some older plants that have not been designed to take full-thickness slip-plates, it may be impossible to insert them. A compromise will be necessary. When it was opened up, the pump and adjoining lines were found to be full of hydrate, a compound of water and butane that stays solid at a higher temperature than ice.
A steam hose was used to clear the choke. Soon afterward there was a leak of butane, which was ignited by a furnace 40 m away and exploded. The suction valve was also blocked by ice and was one turn open [22]. If you are not convinced that all isolation valves should be backed up by slip-plates before maintenance takes place, at least back up valves on lines containing materials that might turn solid and then melt.
However, this system is not foolproof, as shown by the following incidents. In one case the wrong circuit was isolated, but the circuit that should have been isolated was dead because the power supply had failed. It was restored while work was being carried out. In another case the circuit that should have been isolated fed outside lighting. The circuit was dead because it was controlled by a photo-eye control [41].
On several occasions maintenance teams have not realized that by isolating a circuit they have also isolated equipment that was still needed. In one case they isolated heat tracing tape and, without realizing it, also isolated a ventilation fan. The wiring was not in accordance with the drawings [42]. In another case maintenance team members isolated a power supply without realizing that they were also isolating the power to nitrogen blanketing equipment and an oxygen analyzer and alarm.
Air leaked into the unit and was not detected, and an explosion occurred [43]. An unusual case of inadvertent reconnection occurred when a contract electrician pulled a cable, and it came out of the junction box. He thought he had pulled it loose, so he replaced it, but it had been deliberately disconnected [41]. Preparation for Maintenance 11 1.
For example: a Ajoint that had to be broken was marked with chalk. The mechanic broke another joint that had an old chalk mark on it.
He was splashed with a corrosive chemical. Before the mechanic could start work, a heavy rain washed off the chalk mark. The mechanic "remembered" where the chalk mark had been. He was found cutting his way with a hacksaw through a line containing a hazardous chemical. IC Water was dripping from a joint on a line on a pipebridge. Scaffolding was erected to provide access for repair. But to avoid having to climb up onto the scaffold, the process foreman pointed out the leaking joint from the ground and asked a mechanic to remake the joint in the "water line.
So when the mechanic broke the joint he was overcome and, because of the poor access, was rescued only with difficulty. It was pointed out lo the mechanic from the floor above. He went down a flight of stairs, approached the valve from the side, and removed the bonnet from a compressed air valve.
It flew off, grazing his face. When the work inside the tank was complete, six slip-plates were removed. Unfortunately, one of those removed was a permanent slip-plate left in position to prevent contamination. One of the temporary slip-plates was left behind. He removed the top manhole cover and then went down to the floor below to remove a manhole cover there.
Instead of removing the cover from the manhole on autoclave No. Polymer had formed around the inside of the manhole, so when he removed the bolts, there was no immediate evidence of pressure inside the vessel. Almost immediately afterward the pressure blew off the cover. The mechanic and two other men were blown to the ground and killed. Contractors were removing surplus equipment and thought that these panels were supposed to be removed.
The surplus equipment should have been clearly marked [44]. The operator who was asked to prepare the line and issue the permit-to-work misunderstood his instructions and thought a vent line had to be treated.
There would be no need to gas-free this line, and he allowed the work to go ahead. It went ahead, on the correct line; the chlorine reacted with the iron, a 0. Tagging would have prevented heat treatment of a line full of chlorine. Incidents like these and many more could be prevented by fitting a numbered tag to the joint or valve and putting that number on the work permit. In incident c , the foreman would have had to go up onto the scaffold to fix the tag.
Accidents have occurred, however, despite tagging systems. In one plant a mechanic did not check the tag number and broke a joint that had been tagged for an earlier job; the tag had been left in position. Tags should be removed when jobs are complete.
In another plant the foreman allowed a planner to fix the tags for him and did not check that they were fixed to the right equipment. The foreman prepared one line for maintenance, but the tags were on another. A mechanic was asked to repair No. Not unreasonably, he assumed that No. Numbering pumps like this leads to error. He did not check the numbers. Hot oil came out of the pump when he dismantled it.
A man was asked to repair A. When he went onto the structure, he saw that two were labeled B and C but the other two were not labeled. He assumed that A was the old unlabeled crystallizer and started work on it. Actually, A was the new crystallizer. The original three were called B. Crystallizer A was reserved for a possible future addition for which space was left Figure Old Old Figure Which is crystallizer A?
The B label was on the side of the B cooler farthest away from the B fan and near the A fan. Not unreasonably, workers who were asked to overhaul the B fan assumed it was the one next to the B label and overhauled it. The power had not been isolated. But fortunately. Before long, repairs were carried out an the couplings of two adjacent pumps. You can guess what happened. It would be even better to paint the numbers on the plinths. An operator was asked to prepare JAa small pump-for repair. He thought the foreman said JlOOl and went to it.
JlOOl was a 40, HP compressor. Fortunately, the size of the machine made him hesitate. He asked the foreman if he really wanted the compressor shut down. The maintenance workers started work on the ceilings as well and cut through live electric cables.
When the job was complete, the welders rolled the tank over so that another part became the top. Some residue, which had been covered by water, caught fire. The second operator misunderstood his instructions and issued a permit for the wrong line.
Afterward, the lead operator said he thought it was obvious that the line to be heat-treated was the one that had been renewed the day before [24]. He did so. Unfortunately, he removed a fuse labeled FU-5 from the fuseboard that supplied the control room, not from the fuseboard that supplied the equipment room [25]. Not only were his instructions ambiguous, but the labeling system was poor. The operator checked the disconnection and signed the permit-to-work for the modification.
A second operator certified that that preparation had been carried out correctly. The construction worker who was to carry out the modification checked the cable with a current detector and found that the wrong one had been disconnected. It was then found that the cable was incorrectly described on the written instructions given to the operators.
The description of the cable was not entirely clear. The second operator, or checker, had not been trained to check cables []. This incident shows the weakness of checking procedures. The first operator may assume that if anything is wrong the checker will pick it up: the checker may become casual because he has never known the first operator to make an error see Sections 3.
The set pressures were stamped on the flanges, but this did not prevent the valves from being interchanged. A number of similar incidents have occurred in other plants. Such incidents can be prevented, or at least made much less likely, by tying a numbered tag to the relief valve when it is removed and tying another tag with the same number to the flange.
To avoid a shutdown, a hot tap and stopple was carried out, that is, the line was bypassed and the leaking section plugged off stoppled while in use. The job went well mechanically, but the leak continued. It was then found that the leak was not coming from the steam line but from a hot condensate line next to it.
The condensate flashed as it leaked, and the leak looked like a steam leak [26]. The following incidents show what can happen if these tests are not carried out or not carried out thoroughly. Large pieces of equipment or those of complex shape should be tested in several places, using detector heads at the ends of long leads if necessary see Section 5.
Six people were killed, 29 injured, and the tank was destroyed. The tank top was thrown into the air, turned over, and deposited upside down on the bottom of the tank. The tank had contained a light naphtha and had not been thoroughly cleaned before repairs started. It had been filled with water and then emptied, but some naphtha remained in various nooks and crannies. It might, for example, have gotten into the hollow roof supports through pinholes or cracks and then drained out when the tank was emptied.
No tests were carried out with combustible gas detectors. Preparation for Maintenance d7 It is believed that the vapor was ignited by welding near an open vent. The body of the welder was found ft up on the top of a neighboring gasholder, still holding a welding torch.
According to the incident report, there was no clear; division of responsibilities between the Gas Board and the contractor who was carrying out the repairs. Vapor came out of the manhole and caught fire. As the vapor burned, air was sucked into the tank through the vent until the contents became explosive.
The tank then blew up [ 5 ]. It was disconnected at both ends. Four hours later the atmosphere at the end farthest from the relief valve was tested with a combustible gas detector. The head of the detector was pushed as far down the tailpipe as it would go; no gas was detected, and a work permit was issued. While the relief valve discharge flange was being ground, a flash and bang occurred at the other end of the tailpipe. Gas in the tailpipe20 m long and containing a number of bends-had not dispersed and had not been detected by a test at the other end of the pipe.
Before allowing welding or similar operations on a pipeline that has or could have contained flammable gas or liquid, I sweep out the line with steam or nitrogen from end to end, and 2 test at the point at which welding will be carried out. If necessary, a hole may have to be drilled in the pipeline. Id Solids in a vessel can --hold" gas that is released only slowly. The vessel had been prepared for maintenance in a similar way on three previous occasions, but there was then far fewer granules in the reactor [14] see Section As the drum was brand new, no precautions were taken, and no tests were carried out.
The manufacturer had cleaned the drum with a flammable solvent, had not gasfreed it, and had not warned the customer [15]. An empty tank that had contained ethanol exploded, killing three men. The ethanol vapor had leaked out of a faulty seal on the gauge hatch; it was ignited by a torch, and the flame traveled back into the tank. The men who were killed had taken combustible gas detectors onto the job, but no one knew whether they had used them correctly or had used them at all.
Gas testing should be carried out by the operating team before it issues a permit-to-work; since the tanks would have had to be gas-freed before they were moved, this should have been done before hot work started [27].
The regenerators are vented to the air, so there should be no need to test or inert them before maintenance. However, on one occasion when a manway cover was being removed, 50 hours after the unit had shut down, an explosion occurred inside the vessel, and flames appeared at various openings in the ducts connected to it.
Carbon is usually burnt off before a shutdown. On this occasion the air blower failed, and the unit had to shut down at once. Steam was blown into the regenerator, and most of the catalyst was removed. However, the steam reacted with the carbon on the remaining catalyst, forming hydrogen and carbon monoxide. When the manway cover was removed, air entered the regenerator, and an explosion occurred.
Older regenerators are fitted with a spare blower. Some plants connect up mobile blowers if their single blower fails. This incident shows the importance, during hazard and operability studies see Chapter 1S , of considering abnormal conditions, such as failure of utilities, as well as normal operation. Preparation for Maintenance 19 -1 3.
Several incidents have occurred because tesxs were carried out several hours beforehand and conditions changed. For the last two years it had been open at one end and blanked at the other. The first job was welding a flange onto the open end. This was done without incident. The second job was to fit a 1-in. A hole was drilled in the pipe and the inside of the line tested. No gas was detected.
Fortunately, a few hours later, just before welding was about to start, the inside of the pipe was tested again, and flammable gas was detected. It is believed that some gas had remained in the line for 12 years and a slight rise in temperature had caused it to move along the pipeline. Some people might have decided that a line out of use for 12 years did not need testing at all.
Fortunately, the men concerned did not take this view. They tested the inside of the line and tested again immediately before welding started. During this time the concentration of benzene rose.
The maintenance team was not able to start for 40 days. During this time a small amount of acid that had been left in the tank attacked the metal.
No further tests were carried out. When welding started, an explosion occurred [6]. The atmosphere in the excavation was tested with a combustible gas detector, and because no gas was detected, a welding permit was issued.
Half an hour latter. Some hydrocarbons had leaked out of the ground. This incident shows that it may not be sufficient to test just before welding starts. It may be necessary to carry out continuous tests using a portable combustible gas detector alarm.
The river wall was lined with steel plates. The atmosphere was tested for flammable gas before work started. After a break the welder started again. There was a flash fire, which did not last long but killed the welder. An underground pipeline was leaking, and it seems that the liquid had collected in a sump and then overflowed into the sewer.
For example: a Welding had to be carried out on a pipeline 6 m above the ground. Tests inside and near the pipeline were negative, and so a work permit was issued. A piece of hot welding slag bounced off a pipeline and fell onto a sump 6 m below and 2.
The cover on the sump was loose, and some oil inside caught fire. Welding jobs should be boxed in with fire-resistant sheets. Nevertheless, some sparks or pieces of slag may reach the ground. So drains and sumps should be covered. When the job was planned, the electrical hazards were considered and also the hazards of working on ladders.
But it did not occur to anyone that harmful or unpleasant fumes might come out of the duct. Yet ventilation systems are installed to get rid of fumes. Checks showed that the radiation level outside the cell was low, but no one thought about the roof.
Several years later. Fortunately she was carrying a radiation detector, and when it alarmed. The radiation stream to the roof was greater than 50 mSvkr, and the technician received a dose of about 1 mSv. In practice most radiation workers receive far smaller doses. Several similar incidents have been reported [34].
Not many readers will handle radioactive materials, but this incident and the previous one do show how easy it is to overlook some of the routes by which hazardous materials or effects can escape from containment.
This is particularly hazardous if overhead lines have to be broken. Liquid splashes down onto the ground. Funnels and hoses should be used to catch spillages. When possible, drain points in a pipeline should be fitted at low points, and slip-plates should be fitted at high points.
Even when service lines are not directly connected to process materials, they should always be tested before maintenance, particularly if hot work is permitted on them, as the following incidents show: a A steam line was blown down and cold cut.
Then a plug was hammered into one of the open ends. A welder struck an arc ready to weld in the plug. An explosion occuued, and the plug was blown out of the pipeline, fortunately missing the welder. Acid had leaked into the pipeline through a corroded heating coil in an acid tank and had reacted with the iron of the steam pipe.
The welder was burned but not seriously. There was a leaking tube in the wasle heat boiler. The water side should have been kept up to pressure until the process side was depressured.
In addition, the inside of the water lines should have been tested with a combustible gas detector. See also Section 5. The valves were welded in. To clear a choke, a fitter removed the bonnet and inside of a valve. He saw that the seat was choked with solid and started to chip it away. As he did so, a jet of corrosive chemical came out under pressure from behind the solid, hit him in the face, pushed his goggles aside, and entered his eye.
The first joint was opened without trouble. But when the second joint was opened, acid came out under pressure and splashed the fitter and his assistant in their faces.
Acid had attacked the pipe, building up gas pressure in some parts and blocking it with sludge in others. More bolts were removed, and the joint pulled apart, but no more acid came. In all three cases the lines were correctly isolated from operating equipment. Other incidents due to trapped pressure and clearing chokes are described in Sections Contractors are usually not familiar with chemicals and do not know how to handle them. Preparation for Maintenance 23 Occasionally, however, it may be impossible to be certain that a piece of equipment is spotlessly clean.
If this is the case, or if there is some doubt about its cleanliness, then the hazards and the necessary precautions should be made known to the workshop or the other company. This can be done by attaching a certificate to the equipment. This certificate is not a work permit. It does not authorize any work but describes the state of the equipment and gives the other company sufficient information to enable it to carry out the repair or modification safely.
Before issuing the certificate. If the problems are complex, a member of the plant staff may have to visit the other company. The following incidents show the need for these precautions. The tubes had contained a process material that tends to form chokes, and the shell had contained steam. Before the exchanger left the plant, the free tubes were cleaned with high-pressure water jets.
But these holes were not big enough to allow the tubes to be cleaned. A certificate was attached to the exchanger stating that welding and burning were allowed but only to the shell. The contractor, having removed most of the tubes, decided to put workers into the shell to grind out the plugged tubes. He telephoned the plant and asked if it would be safe to let workers enter the shell.
He did not say why he wanted them to do so. The plant engineer who took the telephone call said that the shell side was clean and therefore entering it would be safe. He was not told that the workers were going into it to grind out some of the hibes.
Two men went into the shell and started grinding. They were affected by fumes, and the job was left until the next day. Another three workers then restarted the job and were affected so badly that thejr were hospitalized.
Fortunately, they soon recovered. The certificate attached to the exchanger when it left the plant should have contained much more information.
It should have said that the plugged tubes had not been cleaned and that they contained a chemical that gave off fumes when heated. Better still, the plugged tubes should have been opened up and cleaned. The contractor would have to remove the plugs, so why not remove them before they left the plant?
Titanium sent for scrap should be clearly labeled with a warning note. Do your- irzstiwtions cover tlze points nientioned in tlzis section? What is to be done. How the equipment is isolated and identified. What hazards, if any, remain. What precautions should be taken. This section describes incidents that occurred because of loopholes in the procedure for issuing work permits or because the procedure was not followed.
There is no clear distinction between these two categories. Often the procedure does not cover, or seem to cover, all circumstances. Those concerned use this as the reason, or excuse, for a shortcut, as in the following two incidents: 1.
During the evening the process foreman wanted to use the line the plumbers were working on. He checked that the line was safe to use, and he asked the shift maintenance Preparation for Maintenance 25 man to sign off the permit. Next morning, the plumbers, not knowing that their permit had been withdrawn, started work on the line while it was in use. To prevent similar incidents from happening.
After the cover had been removed, it was found that the necessary manpower would not be available until the next day. SO it was decided to replace the manhole cover and regenerate the catalyst overnight. By this time it was evening, and the maintenance foreman had gone home and left the work permit in his office, which was locked.
The reactor was therefore boxed up and catalyst regeneration carried out with the permit still in force. The next day a fitter. Fortunately, the liquid was mostly water, and he was not injured. The reactor should not have been boxed up and put on line until the original permit had been handed back. If it was locked up, then the maintenance supervisor should have been called in.
Except in an emergency, plant operations should never be carried out while a work permit is in force on the equipment concerned. Although the line had been drained, there might have been some trapped pressure see Section 1.
Case histories illustrate what went wrong, why it went wrong, and then guide you in how wha circumvent similar tragedies. Select Appendix 2 — Final Thoughts. Contents B Still Going Wrong.
Acknowledgments Preface Principal additions to fourth edition Units and Nomenclature. Appendix 3 Some Tips for Accident Investigators. Select Chapter 21 — Inherently Safer Design. Cookies are used trevor kletz what went wrong this site. Trevor kletz what went wrong library Help Advanced Book Search. Select Appendix tgevor — Recommended Reading. Select Chapter 2 — Modifications. Case histories illustrate what went wrong, why it went wrong, and then guide you in how to circumvent trvor tragedies.
The new edition continues and extends the wisdom, innovations and strategies of previous editions, by intro Select Chapter 1 — Preparation for Maintenance.
Select Chapter 16 — Materials of Construction. Case histories illustrate what went wrong, Dept United Kingdom vapor vent vessel water qrong welding wrong.
Select Chapter 13 — Tank Trucks and Cars.
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